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Abstract—We consider the management of an energy har-
vesting wireless sensor network, inspired by game theory so as
to obtain a distributed multi-agent operation. In particular, we
focus on asymmetries in the nodes energetic capabilities, and
how do they impact on the resulting performance. We frame the
problem as a repeated Bayesian game with asymmetric players
and incomplete information, where also the private information
available at each node is asymmetric. We find out that instead of
a proportionally fair resource utilization, such a situation ends
up in an even more unbalanced situation, which leads to an
inefficient management where certain nodes are utilized beyond
their fair share. Future research directions are identified so as
to recover information about asymmetries from the strategic
gameplay of the sensors and thus enable a better management.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor network; energy harvesting;
battery management; Bayesian games; repeated games
I. INTRODUCTION
Energetic sustainability of a wireless sensor network (WSN)
is one of the main requirements of its operation, since battery-
powered sensors have a finite energy reserve. At the same
time, energy demand for wireless nodes is ever increasing
worldwide. One solution aims at increasing both robustness
and environmental sustainability of sensor networks can be
represented by energy harvesting mechanisms. [1]
This still presents several challenges related to the design
of efficient policies for wireless sensor networks [2], [3], since
nodes are usually programmed to carry out tasks without co-
ordination. Depending on the rules set and making a decision
on which sensor is associable to a certain task, there may still
be inefficiencies. No node can be active to provide service, or
multiple nodes are simultaneously active, which represents an
energetic wastage. This is further complicated by the lack of
information about the energy levels of the nodes. If a node
is delegated to a task, but due to high battery stress it gets
depleted, that task will be unsolved even though another sensor
could have carried it out.
One possible solution is to approach the problem from
the standpoint of game theory, so as to model multi-agent
interactions with different objectives [4]. Relevant to this
paper, [5] applies a game theoretical approach for battery-
powered WSN in which the battery state of a sensor is private
information; it computes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that
is found and compared with the perfect-information game.
In [6] game-theoretic approach is applied to analyze multi-
channel and multi-access schemes. Authors prove the Pareto-
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optimality of the Nash equilibrium of the system and offer
an online-learning algorithm for the multi-channel and multi
access system. Authors of [7] consider the WSN as Bayesian
for warning notifications to avoid energy overuse in bottleneck
nodes in a clustered solar-powered network. All these papers
consider a symmetric case, e.g., with identical battery storage.
In general, game theory is used for distributed optimization
under the assumption that nodes are all rational but they are
also assumed to be identical and perfectly coordinated, so
that the functioning conditions are equivalent for all of them.
In reality, there may be several differences in environmental
conditions for energy harvesting of each sensor; for example,
sensors can be equipped by solar panels with different ori-
entations, or they can significantly differ in their circuitry or
battery type. Past activity history of each sensor, and private
information about the surrounding environment, also affect
the ability of the sensor to operate. Each sensor performs
differently in managing and transmitting data, and battery
stress can change considerably. Another cause of asymmetry
can be that a sensor may or may not have complete information
about the energy level performance of other players.
Specifically, we study a case of non-identical energy har-
vesting sensors that perform some tasks (transmissions of
packets with variable size) assigned to a common service avail-
able to all of them, but distributedly managed as a participatory
activity. We formulate the analysis as a repeated Bayesian
game with asymmetric players. We consider the operation of
the WSN by discussing the implications of asymmetries in the
nodes’ characteristics for energy harvesting (such as a battery
capacity), and also we investigate the effect of having some
information as private. One sensor updates its belief based
only on the history of the game, while the other makes its
decisions taking into consideration the information about the
capacity and the energy state of the other player.
The ideal management of such a network would be to still
exploit the nodes proportionally to their capabilities. However,
since the management is distributed and the nodes do not have
full awareness of the entire network, this principle may cease
to be applicable. Thus, we use the model of the Bayesian game
with asymmetric players as a way to quantify the resulting
unfairness. We performed some simulations and showed that
this situation does not lead to the ideal game performance
proportion, but is still more balanced in comparison with the
strategy, when all sensors are unaware of asymmetries.
Future research directions are identified to avoid these
imbalances; for example, a proper belief update rule can be
designed so that in the long run the nodes are able to acquire
the knowledge they lack, or at least to estimate it.978-1-5386-2723-5/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE
II. MODEL
We consider a WSN virtually playing a repeated Bayesian
two-player game with asymmetric players. Each game round
represents the decision of each sensor about whether to pursue
a given task. Players are denoted as 𝑗 and 𝑘, respectively.
Each task is also associated with the amount of energy for
its transmission. We consider the transmission of data packets
as the tasks that the sensors try to accomplish, in which case
the amount of energy is a direct consequence of the packet
size. However, the approach can be easily generalized to other
kinds of tasks as well. The decision about whether to transmit
the packet or not is also based on current and average energy
level of the other sensor in the network [5]. The key point of
this decision-making process is that, according to a Bayesian
game setup, players may not have full knowledge about the
scenario and therefore create themselves 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠 to handle
the situation. The decisions they make are actually based on
expectations (averages) of their beliefs [4].
For our problem, we assume that node 𝑘 is fully aware of
the network operation, while node 𝑗 represents an entire room
full of LIFO policies. We use these notations:
𝑒𝑖𝑙 - level of energy of sensor 𝑙 ∈ {𝑗, 𝑘} at round 𝑖
𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙 - capacity of sensor 𝑙’s battery, with 𝑙 ∈ {𝑗, 𝑘}
𝑒𝑙 - average energy level of sensor 𝑙 ∈ {𝑗, 𝑘}
𝑒𝑖𝑞 - amount of energy required to transmit data at round 𝑖.
𝑎𝑖𝑙 - energy arrival at node 𝑙 ∈ {𝑗, 𝑘}, at round 𝑖.
In the repeated Bayesian game players care about the future
consequences of their current behavior. Every stage a sensor
has to decide whether to spend energy or store it. In the former
case, the level of energy in stage 𝑖+ 1 will be:
𝑒𝑖+1𝑗 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑒
𝑖
𝑗 − 𝑒𝑖𝑞 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗) (1)
If the sensor makes the decision to store energy, then the
energy level of its battery will be corrected only by an amount
of the arrival energy and will be:
𝑒𝑖+1𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑒
𝑖
𝑗 + 𝑎
𝑖
𝑗 , 𝑒
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 ) (2)
In a single-device system, sensor transmits only if the
energy state of the battery is greater than a threshold, or in
other words, sensor 𝑗 transmits, only if 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑒𝑡ℎ, where 𝑒𝑡ℎ
is a given energy threshold [5]. If 𝜇𝑗 is a probability that the
energy level of sensor 𝑗 is greater than its threshold in the
𝑖 round, or in other words, a probability, that the sensor has
enough energy to transmit, then any 𝜇𝑗 > 𝜇𝑗 will allow the
transmission: {
𝜇𝑗 = 1 𝑒𝑗 ≥ 𝑒𝑡ℎ
𝜇𝑗 = 0 𝑒𝑗 < 𝑒𝑡ℎ
(3)
If we consider the situation with several sensors in the WSN,
the performance analysis is to be distributed, and each sensor
has to transmit less data in total, than in a single-device system.
It can be proven that in this case the threshold is corrected
by the probability that another sensor also transmits the data
packet. Let 𝜇𝑘 be a probability that the energy level of sensor
𝑘 is greater than its threshold in the 𝑖 round, then:{
𝜇𝑗 = 1 𝑒𝑗 ≥ 𝑒𝑡ℎ1−𝜇𝑘
𝜇𝑗 = 0 𝑒𝑗 <
𝑒𝑡ℎ
1−𝜇𝑘
(4)
We now consider that information about the opponent’s
energy level and the capacity of the battery is not symmetric.
We denote the information about the current energy level 𝑒𝑖𝑗
and the capacity of the battery 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 of sensor 𝑗 as a common
knowledge. The information about the energy levels of the
sensor 𝑘 (𝑒𝑖𝑘, 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 ) is private. Therefore, sensor 𝑘 is able to
make decisions guided by the rules of the rational behavior,
taking into consideration energy levels of both sensors. In
particular, the probability that sensor 𝑘 should increase its
transmission rate if the energy level of sensor 𝑗 may not
be enough for transmitting an incoming data (𝑒𝑗 ≥ 𝑒𝑡ℎ)
packet, and monotonically increase if the value of the threshold
increases over the energy level of sensor 𝑗 in the 𝑖− 1 round.
In addition, the higher energy level of the sensor 𝑘, then the
higher probability that sensor 𝑘 will transmit the data packet
in the next round only if the battery has enough resources or
𝑒𝑞 > 𝑒
𝑖−1
𝑘 . Based on this, we bring the following
Proposition 1. The strategy of sensor 𝑘 in the 𝑖 stage is:
𝜇𝑖𝑘 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛([𝑒𝑞 > 𝑒
𝑖−1
𝑗 ] ⋅
𝑒𝑞
𝑒𝑖−1𝑗
+ [𝑒𝑞 > 𝑒
𝑖−1
𝑘 ] ⋅
𝑒𝑖−1𝑘
𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘
, 1) (5)
where threshold 𝑒𝑞 is calculated by using the statistical infor-
mation about the data packets sent in the 𝑡 = (0, ..., 𝑖− 1).
In comparison with sensor 𝑘, sensor 𝑗 operates based
only on the information about its own energy level and the
history of the game. Similarly with [8], we denote the history
of sensor 𝑘 actions as ℎ𝑖𝑘 = (𝑎𝑘(𝑡0), ..., 𝑎𝑘(𝑡𝑖−1)), where
𝑎𝑗(𝑡𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝑖 = {𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡} is an action of
sensor 𝑗. We identify the system of belief updates for sensor
𝑗 about the distribution probability of sensor 𝑘, i.e., sensor 𝑗
updates its belief about the energy state is under or below its
threshold of the sensor 𝑘 by using Bayes rule from round 𝑖
to 𝑖+1. Let 𝜇𝑗(𝜃𝑘∣ℎ𝑖) be belief of sensor 𝑗 about the energy
level of sensor 𝑘 at round 𝑖, where 𝜃𝑘 = 𝑒𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑘 , then the
posterior distribution will take form:
𝜇𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑘∣ℎ𝑖𝑘) =
𝜇𝑖𝑘(𝜃∣ℎ
𝑖
𝑘)𝑃 (𝑎𝑘(𝑡𝑖)∣ℎ𝑖𝑘)∑
𝜇𝑖𝑘(𝜃𝑘∣ℎ𝑖𝑘)𝑃 (𝑎𝑘(𝑡𝑖)∣𝜃𝑘∣ℎ𝑖𝑘)
(6)
where 𝑃 (𝑎𝑘(𝑡𝑖)∣𝑒𝑖𝑘 > 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑘 ∣𝑎𝑗(𝑡𝑖), ℎ𝑖𝑘) is the probability that the
action will be observed in the 𝑖 round. From this equation we
see that to update the belief, the whole history ℎ𝑖𝑘 of sensor
𝑘 has to be taken into account to calculate the probability a
given action 𝑎𝑘(𝑡𝑖) is played.
In our game, both sensors choose an action simultaneously
at the beginning of each game. And sensor 𝑘 make strategic
decision expressed in (5), and sensor 𝑗 every round updates
beliefs using the Bayes’ rule, as per equation (6). The perfor-
mance of such a system will be presented in the next section.
III. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a two - sensor WSN, described by parameters
previously outlined. Sensors have different battery capacities
and the system has a single data queue that represents the
source for tasks to be performed by nodes. Each round a
data packet arrives to be transmitted with random energy
consumption 𝑒𝑖𝑞 .
We compare 2 scenarios of belief update and how they
affect the fairness of the game. Firstly, scenario 1: when two
TABLE I – SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Values
Capacity of 𝑆𝑗 0..20
Capacity of 𝑆𝑘 20
Energy consumption in 𝑖 round 𝑒𝑞 1..5
Arrival amount of energy in 𝑖 round 𝑎𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖𝑘 1..4
Energy arrival rate 𝛼, 𝛽 0.6
sensors transmit randomly with probability 𝜇𝑗 = 0.5 and
𝜇𝑘 = 0.5 respectively, at each round 𝑖. We do not update
beliefs about the energy level of the opponent player. In
scenario 2 we introduce the belief update rule about sensor 𝑘
and the behavior rule of sensor 𝑘 with respect to the energy
levels of both sensors, proposed in the previous section. We
vary the value of 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 to reveal dependence between chosen
strategy and fairness of the game. We expect that in the ideal
situation the sensor with bigger capacity transmits more data
amount, or by other words, to observe the directly proportional
relationship between balance in throughput and capacity of a
sensor’s battery if the strategy is good enough.1
Note that throughput depends on three components: amount
of lost data, total energy consumption for data transmitted by
sensor 𝑘 and 𝑗. Fig.1 demonstrates three scenarios:
– ideal scenario, when no data loss is observed and each
sensor transmits data according to its capacity of the battery,
for example if 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 /𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 = 0.5, then 𝑘 and 𝑗 transmit 2/3
and 1/3 of total data amount respectively.
– scenario 1, in which each sensor transmits data randomly.
– scenario 2, in which one sensor transmits data according
energy state and capacity information of the opponent sensor,
obtaining each time slot, and the opponent sensor transmits
data updating its belief about energy state of the first sensor
by cumulating the history ℎ𝑖𝑘 of its transmission.
If sensors transmits data randomly with 𝜇𝑘 = 𝜇𝑗 = 0.5,
when both sensors decide to transmit the data packet or
to drop it, we obtain an asymmetry reflected in the results
(Fig.1: data losses curves). Moreover, scenario 2 demonstrates
significantly smaller amount of data losses in comparison with
the scenario 1.
Furthermore, from Fig. 1 we can notice, that in both
scenarios if 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 /𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 ≥ 0.5, performance and data losses
of both sensors are equalized. Both scenarios do not provide
the balanced performance, but scenario 1 is slightly more
rational, when 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 /𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 < 0.5, because sensor 𝑘 takes
into consideration in its strategy the capacity of sensor 𝑗. In
particular, if 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 /𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 = 0.1, then in scenario 1 40 % of
total data amount will be lost, 40 % is transmitted by the
sensor with the higher capacity and 20% is transmitted by the
sensor with the lower capacity. In scenario 2, 10 % of data
will be lost, 80 % will be sent by a sensor with the battery
with higher capacity and 10 % with the lower capacity. Note
that in the ideal situation it should be equal to 0 %, 95 %
and 5 % respectively. Thus, the results found prove that the
knowledge about the asymmetric property of the system makes
its performance more balanced and robust.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We consider a wireless sensor network consisting of two
asymmetric sensors, powered by batteries with different ca-
1Source code is available upon request from the authors
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Fig. 1 – Numerical Results
pacities. We investigate the role of asymmetries by means of
game theory. We focused on an unbalanced scenario, where,
for example, one sensor knows the asymmetric property of
the system by knowing the energy state and the capacity of
the second sensor, whereas the other one does not know. We
assume that the ideal scenario for such a system is transmitting
data by each sensor proportionally to their battery capacities.
We studied the interaction between sensors as an instance
of a Bayesian game, iteratively updated to better estimate the
prior. We obtained that if both sensors do not take into account
the asymmetric property of the system at all, then the system
is less balanced. The same happens if one sensor knows about
the asymmetry and exploits it in its strategy. In addition, we
demonstrated that these strategies are not effective and ignore
the asymmetric property of energy harvesting WSN if the
relation between sensors capacities is more than 0.5.
For the future work, it is useful to consider asymmetries not
only in the battery capacity, but also in energy arrival rates,
leakage rate and other parameters. Another possibility is to
develop appropriate rules of interaction between asymmetric
sensors in energy harvesting WSNs with the proportion of
performance close to the ideal scenario, meaning that each
sensor transmits data proportionally with its battery capacity.
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